State Strategies in the Containment of Illegal Violence and Terrorism

• In Event: Terrorism

Abstract

Terrorism is an overdetermined phenomenon, and why the onset of terrorist violence may or may not be effectively addressed by state authorities may have multiple proximate and inter-dependent causes. This paper presents a general game-theoretic framework in which one key such cause---the strategic dynamic between citizen groups and a terrorist organization---is developed. The model studies a two-period interaction in the life-cycle of this violence that leads to a possible coordination failure in which citizen groups interact with the state in response to the onset and perpetuation of terrorist violence. The multiple equilibria specify the conditions under which the group alternately alienates support among citizens and generates support among breakaway components of the citizenry. The comparative statics of the model identifies a critical cause for the cycles of violence produced by terrorism, namely the inability of mainstream groups to coordinate a response over terrorist violence. The failure of this coordination can under certain specifications of the model’s parameters result in enduring cycles of political violence and repression of the same. The model’s results are applied to chronic patterns of such violence in contemporary South Asia and the Middle East.

Author

• Ishan Joshi, University of Michigan