Polarization for Paralysis

• In Event: Behavioral Political Economy: Regimes

Abstract

How do authoritarian states’ information operations manipulate foreign public opinion—and consequently voting behavior? Contrary to recent literature on persuasion, we propose a theory of polarization through a combination of confirmation and reactance biases. Authoritarian regimes’ info ops aim to polarize target audiences to preempt hostile winning coalitions, employing strategic narratives on subjects like migration that create group status threats. We test this theory through an original survey experiment on a national sample of Estonians, using excerpts on migration based on Russia-sponsored news in Estonia. We find that, in line with our theory, respondents exposed to Russia-sponsored online news are more likely to experience group status threat and become polarized –– those on the left are more likely to vote for the far-left, while those on the right are more likely to vote for the far-right. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses and also partly explain the rise of more radical parties in Estonia and neighboring Latvia, instability in the parliamentary systems of both countries, and resulting stressors in the regional security architecture.

Authors

• Zenobia Chan, Princeton University

• Noel Foster, Princeton University