Democratic Selection in Inter-Group Contest Games

• In Event: Behavioral Political Economy: Regimes

Abstract

Interactions between groups are often determined by choices made by democratically selected group leaders. We use a laboratory experiment to show that democratic selection affects inter-group contestation through two distinct channels: (1) a selection effect, whereby elected leaders are non-representative of the group and (2) a psychological effect, whereby individuals play differently as leaders compared to when they are not leaders. Both effects increase inter-group competition, which is welfare decreasing. This result is contrary to the near-universal positive effects of democracy found in other studies. We use an online platform that allows us to recruit larger groups (7 members per group) from a more representative sample (mTurk), compared to most existing studies.

Authors

• Sarah Hummel, Harvard University

• Yon Soo Park, Harvard University

• Stephen Chaudoin, Harvard University