Descriptive Representation in International Organizations: The Effect of Governance Reform on IMF Legitimacy

• In Event: IMF, Conditionality, and Intellectual Authority

Abstract

International organizations (IOs) often face questions of legitimacy due to decision-making structures that heavily weight the voices of developed countries. This paper examines whether “descriptive representation”—the degree to which representatives share characteristics of the represented—shapes public opinion toward IOs. We focus on the case of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which often faces criticism for its weighted voting system. We surmise that information about recent IMF governance reforms that expanded the representation of developing countries will increase support for engagement with the institution. Furthermore, we expect this shift to operate through two mechanisms: improving perceptions of “procedural legitimacy”, the belief that the IMF treats borrowers fairly; and enhancing perceptions of “substantive legitimacy”, the expectation that borrowing countries will receive favorable terms. Analysis of survey experiments fielded in three developing countries—Argentina, China and Turkey—largely support our conjectures. In each case, respondents who were informed that developing countries have gained more influence at the Fund are more likely to support working with the IMF compared to those who were told that wealthy countries have more say. We find that this increase in support works by enhancing perceptions of procedural legitimacy. We find only very limited support that substantive legitimacy plays a role.

Authors

• Dimitar D Gueorguiev, Syracuse University

• Daniel McDowell, Syracuse University

• David A. Steinberg, Johns Hopkins University

• S. Erdem Aytaç, Koç University