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Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel
While there is no shortage of examples of blatant constitutional changes for particularistic ends in authoritarian regimes, sometimes even democratic leaders renege on the constitutional bargain, which aim at limiting government authority, and change the rules to increase their authority. Under what circumstances do authoritarian and democratic leaders manipulate institutions to stay in power or increase their authority? More specifically, how do they manage the constitutional changes and institutional manipulations to increase the duration of their survival in power? Do political origins of constitutional change matter for limits on the executive authority? This panel presents some of the most recent studies that address these questions using original data sets and analysis from several world regions. Papers include a variety of methods from cross-national statistical analyses to comparative case studies at the intersection of political science and legal studies.
Term-Extending Constitutional Reforms and Authoritarian Survival - Tofigh Maboudi, Loyola University Chicago; Ghazal Poshtkouhian Nadi, Loyola University Chicago; Todd A. Eisenstadt, American University
Constitutional Change and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis - Gabriel L. Negretto, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Mariano Sanchez-Talanquer, El Colegio de México
Explaining the Success and Failure of Term Limit Evasion Attempts - Mila Versteeg, University of Virginia; Anne Meng, University of Virginia
The Prevalence of Particularistic over Public Goods Constitutional Reforms - Todd A. Eisenstadt, American University; Carla Alberti, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Diego Diaz-Rioseco, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Tofigh Maboudi, Loyola University Chicago; Ghazal Poshtkouhian Nadi, Loyola University Chicago