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Constitutional Reforms for Particularistic Ends in Democracies and Autocracies

Wed, September 9, 2:00 to 3:30pm MDT (2:00 to 3:30pm MDT), TBA

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

While there is no shortage of examples of blatant constitutional changes for particularistic ends in authoritarian regimes, sometimes even democratic leaders renege on the constitutional bargain, which aim at limiting government authority, and change the rules to increase their authority. Under what circumstances do authoritarian and democratic leaders manipulate institutions to stay in power or increase their authority? More specifically, how do they manage the constitutional changes and institutional manipulations to increase the duration of their survival in power? Do political origins of constitutional change matter for limits on the executive authority? This panel presents some of the most recent studies that address these questions using original data sets and analysis from several world regions. Papers include a variety of methods from cross-national statistical analyses to comparative case studies at the intersection of political science and legal studies.

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