Consolidation of Power in Authoritarian Regimes

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This panel explores the dynamics of elite purges and the consolidation of power in autocracies using a variety of methodological approaches. Though the literature recognizes the importance of the consolidation of power, we know very little about when and how dictators take actions to eliminate rival elites and promote the concentration of power in their hands. Two exciting fields of research on authoritarianism examine (a) institutions and (b) repression. While important, these literatures are not integrated. Furthermore, the research on repression often focuses on repression of citizens. This panel suggests that authoritarian institutionalization and repression, particularly purges of elites, may interact in important ways. With that in mind, this panel aims to improve our scholarly understanding of this issue by, first, examining variations in the targets of purges as well as how the availability of replacement personnel affects purges, and, second, by investigating the role of political institutions in the process of elite purges.


First, Shen-Bayh and Choi examine the logic of judicial appointments and purges by focusing on selection and revokement decisions in an authoritarian judiciary. Using an original dataset of judicial turnover in Kenya from 1963 through 1992, they illuminate the causal mechanisms behind the changes in geographic and ethnic patterns in the make-up of the judiciary. Second, Sudduth analyzes the dynamics of elite purges by focusing on whether the targets of the purges are military officers, or civilian elites. She argues that whether dictators execute extensive purges of civilian elites crucially depends on whether they have purged enough strong military officers and, thus, the possibility of counter-coups is low enough. Using an original data on civilian and military purges from 1980-2010, she illuminates an important consequence of military purges on civilian purges. Third, Model explores variations in the use of anti-corruption purges by focusing on how an availability of alternative loyal elites conditions the dynamics of anti-corruption purges. By utilizing a formal theoretic model as well as the original data on Soviet Politburo membership, he demonstrates that autocrats are more hesitant to use purges under elite availability constraints. Finally, Schuler and Sudduth examine the roles of political institutions in the process of the consolidation of power. In contrast to the existing argument that autocrats hold elections and open legislatures to co-opt rivals, they argue that these institutions are used to signal strength to the population and, thus, purges would increase, not decrease, immediately prior to founding elections. Using an original dataset of civilian and military purges, they demonstrate that elite purges spike immediately prior to founding elections, especially in party-based regimes.

Sub Unit

• Division 44: Democracy and Autocracy

Cosponsor

• Division 4: Formal Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• Who Judges? The Logic of Judicial Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes - Fiona Shen-Bayh, William & Mary; Danny Choi, Brown University

• Timing and Target of Elite Purges in Autocracies - Jun Koga Sudduth, University of Strathclyde

• Elite Loyalty and Anti-Corruption Purges in the Soviet Government - Timothy Model, Miami University

• Cooptation or Intimidation? Purges and Authoritarian Founding Elections - Paul J. Schuler, University of Arizona

Chair

• Jennifer Gandhi Emory University

Discussant

• Ora John Reuter University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee