Political Parties, Central Banks, and the International Economy

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This panel brings together papers that investigate the interaction between international financial markets and domestic politics and central banks. Betz, Bodea and Kerner analyze party manifestos around the world and show that periods of high US interest rates – the principal determinant of global monetary cycles – lead to more market-friendly policy programs in other countries that depend on external capital flows. Grittersova investigates whether financial markets believe that monetary policy decisions of the Bank of England are influenced by pressures from policymakers. Kern and Seddon propose that CBI is used to split sovereign agents and establish shared liabilities between governments and central banks. Finally, Weldzius considers why central banks that are “price-takers” in monetary policy deviate so little from locally “hegemonic” central banks in a region. The panel also features two leading senior scholars (Willett and Leblang) as discussants.

Sub Unit

• Division 16: International Political Economy

Chair

• David A. Steinberg Johns Hopkins University

Discussants

• Thomas D. Willett Claremont Graduate University

• David Leblang University of Virginia

Individual Presentations

• US-Monetary Cycles and the Global Demand for Neo-liberal Politics - Timm Betz, Technical University of Munich; Cristina Bodea, Michigan State University; Andrew Kerner, Michigan State University

• Do Financial Markets Listen When Politicians Talk About Monetary Policy? - Jana Grittersova, University of California, Riverside

• The International Political Economy of Central Bank Independence - Andreas Kern, Georgetown University; Jack Seddon