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US Bureaucratic and Legislative Politics in International Organizations

Thu, September 10, 12:00 to 1:30pm MDT (12:00 to 1:30pm MDT), TBA

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Research in the study of international organizations increasingly relies on principal agent frameworks and US politics as part of their theoretical frameworks. This panel brings together research in international organizations that brings the United States, and theories from American politics, squarely in focus. One paper utilizes bureaucratic politics approaches: Stanescu examines the competing pressures from industries and bureaucracies as determinants of international economic policy in the United States. Two papers look at the role of Congress in the ratification of international agreements in the early 20th century: Arias and Gray examine position-switching across parties in the eventual jettisoning of the League of Nations, while Carson and Conklin look at the role of executive strategy in engineering eventual Congressional approval of the United Nations. Finally, Campbell and Vabulas look at the influence of lobbing from domestic interests in US policies toward the UN after the Cold War. Together, these papers point to a fruitful overlap between theories of US politics and international collaboration.

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