Intra-Party Competition and Elections

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Invernizzi analyzes electoral competition between internally divided parties, where leaders reallocate electoral rents among factions to improve the party's chances at the poll. Kocak studies candidate selection against an incumbent, and shows that incumbents can exploit the divisions in the opposition party to induce them to nominate a weaker challenger, thus improving her reelection prospects. Ascencio & Judd study how political conditions shape observed levels of party unity by analyzing a model of electoral contests between parties composed of factions that have different interests but also want to work together against opposing parties. Izzo, Fiva and Tukiainen formally analyze how the party leader optimally designs the list flexibility in order to solve the moral hazard problem with the individual candidates. We use a unique feature of Norwegian local elections to test our predictions.

Sub Unit

• Division 4: Formal Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• Electoral Competition and Factional Sabotage - Giovanna Invernizzi, Collegio Carlo Alberto

• Divided Parties and Elections - Gleason Judd, Princeton University; Sergio J Ascencio, University of Essex

• Provoking the Opposition - Korhan Kocak, New York University Abu Dhabi

• A Madison Theory of Political Capital - Congyi Zhou, New York University; Catherine Hafer, New York University; Scott Tyson, University of Rochester

Chair

• Carlo Prato Columbia University