Firms, Lobbying, Tariffs, and Policy Outcomes

Session Submission Type: Created Panel

Session Description

How do firms use the political system to their advantage to escape inconvenient trade barriers? How do foreign firms ensure that their interests are represented in domestic politics? How do domestic corporate political activities and geographic locations of firms affect the level of protectionism? Finally, the fourth paper shows that while contributions and lobbying may be tracked at the firm level, policy changes tend to be industry or economy-wide, which can make it difficult to assess the impact of a single firm’s behavior. This paper creates an important new dataset that matches corporate political activity with firm-level outcomes.

Sub Unit

• Division 16: International Political Economy

Individual Presentations

• Escape from Tariffs - Michael-David Mangini, Harvard University

• Geographic Locations, Corporate Lobbying and Trade Remedy: Evidence from the US - Jeheung Ryu, Kookmin University

• Foreign Lobbying through Domestic Subsidiaries - Jieun Lee, University at Buffalo, SUNY

Chair

• Mary Anne Madeira Lehigh University

Discussants

• In Song Kim Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Mary Anne Madeira Lehigh University