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Session Submission Type: Created Panel
The papers in this panel examine the choices of political elites. They investigate how individual traits (expertise) and institutional context (regime type) affect the responsiveness of politicians; how reputation and experience affect the bargaining that drives policymaking; and the policy areas where executives are most likely to try to legislate unilaterally.
The Expertise Curse: How Policy Expertise can Hinder Responsiveness - Miguel M. Pereira, University of Southern California; Patrik Ohberg, The Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg
Who Do Politicians Trust? An Experiment on Elite In-Office Bargaining Heuristics - Lior Sheffer, Tel Aviv University; Nina Serdarevic, Department of Economics; Troy Saghaug Broderstad
Unpacking the Unilateral Actions in Latin America Presidentialism - Magna InĂ¡cio, Federal University of Minas Gerais; Filipe Recch, Stanford University