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Session Submission Type: Created Panel
How do incumbent elites negotiate with various social classes to build state institutions? The papers on this panel consider aspects of state building as a function of relations between elite actors and other social groups. Arias examines civil-military relations in Mexico in the late 19th century to understand processes of state centralization. Peng considers how empowering an impersonal, merit-based bureaucracy decreases the discretionary power of local elites in 20th century China. Boucoyannis explores how the inclusion of non-elite social groups contributed to the health of state institutions in historical European cases. Pardeli and Tiberti focus on the building of state taxation capacity in Latin America through an examination of the conditions under which economic elites supported increasing economic redistribution.
Building Bureaucratic Capacity: Evidence from China - Peng Peng, Duke University
Coordination of Military Elites and State Formation: Mexico, 1821-1876 - Luz Marina Arias, CIDE; Mariano Sanchez-Talanquer, El Colegio de México
Inclusion of the Rich: A Neglected Dimension of Representative Emergence - Deborah A. Boucoyannis, George Washington University
Democracy, Decentralization, and the Effect of Inequality on State Power - Giuliana Pardelli, New York University Abu Dhabi; Federico Tiberti, Princeton University