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The Impact of Presidential Appointment: Montesquieu or The Federalists?

Wed, September 29, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

In 70% of countries across the world, it is the President who appoints judges to the courts (CIA World Factbook, 2021). This makes it one of the most widespread institutions in the world. The United States, Brazil, Sudan, Singapore, Chile, Russia and South Africa are just a few examples. Despite this prevalence, little is understood about how Presidential appointment of judges impacts judicial independence and rule of law.

On one hand, proponents of Presidential appointment argue that Presidential appointment secures independence of the judiciary especially when combined with life-time appointment of judges (Madison et al., 1788). Others like Montesquieu (1778) worry that Presidential appointment may result in judicial subversion by the executive branch of the government, undermining separation of powers and rule of law.

I provide empirical evidence to this debate by investigating the effect of removing Presidential discretion in appointment of judges and estimating its impact on judicial independence and decision quality (Mehmood 2021). A sudden and unique institutional reform in Pakistan dramatically changed the system of Presidential appointment of judges with life-time tenure (like in Singapore or Brazil) to a judicial commission-based selection, which involves appointment by peer judges (like Sweden or the UK). This natural experiment provides an opportunity to understand how removal of Presidential discretion in appointment of judges impacts judicial independence and rule of law.

My analysis uses plausibly random variation in the implementation of the reform due to the age composition of near retirees in the reform year and mandatory retirement age law. I find that Presidential appointment of judges substantially affects judicial decisions. A 10% rise in judges selected by the judicial commission reduces government victories in cases by about two percentage points. This is equivalent to a 4% reduction over the sample mean. Evidence paints a consistent picture that this reduction in pro-government rulings implies a rise in decision quality: peer appointees are more likely to rule on case evidence, better follow due process, and take less time to rule over the cases relative to Presidential appointees.

The evidence on decision quality is further reinforced as I find that judges appointed by their peers are significantly less likely to allow the government to expropriate private property from the citizens than judges appointed by the President. This is consistent with vast qualitative accounts from Pakistan and scholarship where cases involving expropriation of private property by the State are particularly suggestive of bias and subversion by the State (Shleifer and Vishny 2002; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Siddique 2013).


The analysis of mechanisms reveals that our results are explained by rulings in politically salient cases and by “patronage” judges who hold political office prior to their appointments. According to our estimates, judicial appointment by peer judges prevents land expropriations worth 0.14 percent of GDP every year.

The results of this study highlight the potential to reform the Judiciary in weakly institutionalized settings and support institutional design efforts in vulnerable democracies.

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