Strategic Behavior in Presidential Nominations

• In Event: Political Organizations and Parties & Political Networks & American Political Thought & Education Politics and Policy Virtual Poster Session
  In Virtual Poster Session: Political Organizations and Parties Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

Cohen et al’s The Party Decides has done much to explain how presidential candidates are nominated in the post-reform era. But the selection of Joe Biden in 2020 is inconsistent with the thesis. He was an insider who won despite failing to secure a majority of endorsements during the invisible primary.
In this paper I suggest “the party decides” has diminishing explanatory power as the parties polarize and become more internally cohesive. More specifically, I argue the endorsements of governors and members of Congress mean less to both those issuing them and the outcome of the nomination contest. This is because endorsements do little to persuade voters and winning presidential candidates increasingly pick competitors and their supporters for administration jobs in an effort to unify parties that are now internally divided largely on matters of style and personality. I examine the personnel selections of incoming presidents who have won competitive nominations to demonstrate the costs of endorsing the “wrong” candidate have decreased for party elites. I also compare the endorsements by senators and governors who are up for reelection in the next midterm with their counterparts who are not. A third test of the hypothesis looks at the endorsement behavior of House members in marginal seats over time.
By contrast, partisan members of the public have become more strategic. Inter-party polarization has greatly increased the policy costs of defeat in the general election. They therefore gravitate towards a single candidate more quickly. I examine polling data and the voting behavior of partisans in primaries and caucuses to make this part of the argument.

Author

• Andrew J. Taylor, North Carolina State University