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RCV enables candidates who are behind on first choice votes but gain significant secondary support to receive transfer votes from excluded candidates and win elections which they would lose in a straight plurality contest. Such “come-from-behind” or "leap-frog" results are relatively unusual — most RCV elections deliver the same result as plurality contest — but attract significant attention when they do occur. This paper examines the incidence and effects of such non-plurality outcomes at partisan RCV elections in Australia, Ireland and the United States. We find that leap-frog winners tend to adopt more centrist campaign strategies and policy, but also that come-from-behind victories have spurred legal challenges and repeal attempts. Both findings underscore the way RCV changes political behavior and political outcomes compared to plurality elections.