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In warfare, it is often held that some individuals, referred to as “non-combatants,” should be exempt from intentional attack, viewed as non-liable to such intentional harm. Simply, only “combatants” constitute legitimate targets of attack. This view has been enshrined in the ethics of warfare, along with international law, and has become known as the principle of non-combatant immunity. However, despite the uptake of this view, both morally and legally, it is an open question as to who qualifies as a “combatant” and who qualifies as a “non-combatant.” Through my work, I attempt to show that no single factor determines one’s status as a “combatant” or “non-combatant.” Instead, I argue that a plurality of factors count in favor of determining one’s status as a “combatant.” I identify five factors that count towards determining one’s combatant status: responsibility for a threat, consent, direct magnitude of contribution to a threat, knowledge of a threat, and riskiness. Moreover, I also argue that a plurality of factors contribute to discounting one’s status as a “combatant,” instead favoring one’s status as a “non-combatant.” On my view, three factors favor “non-combatant” status: duress, epistemic limitation, and vulnerability. I argue that some soldiers, along with most civilians, will have recourse to at least one of these factors that favor “non-combatant” status. Once I have philosophically differentiated between “combatants” and “non-combatants,” I apply the distinction to revolutions. Because of the complexity of determining one’s status as a “combatant” or “non-combatant,” I posit that for a revolution to be just, its violence must be limited, as a means to protect non-combatants from unnecessary harm. This conclusion results from the practical reality that revolutionaries will often struggle to gather adequate information on one’s combatant/non-combatant status; moreover, given that one’s status can change, in respect to the identified criteria, I argue that a constant need to acquire accurate information places a stringent demand on revolutionaries, which will often be unmet. As a result, I argue that for revolutions to be morally just, they must be limited. This moral limitation on revolutions, I postulate, will affect a plurality of ongoing conflicts, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and any prospective revolution in Hong Kong. Finally, I close my paper by considering whether this combatant/non-combatant distinction leads to impracticality or a form of pacifism.