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The foreign policy bureaucracy derives its authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993) and creates harmony among the state agencies over the state’s foreign policy options. However, recent studies point out the foreign policy preferences of certain governments that aim to limit the role of bureaucratic agencies and elites in policymaking (Verbeek and Zaslova, 2017; Plagermann and Destradi 2019; Wojczewski, 2020). Is there a fragmentation between the elected officials and appointed bureaucrats to reach a consensus in foreign policymaking? If there exists a crisis in foreign policy decision-making at the bureaucratic level, what ideational differences between the government and the bureaucracy differentiate those two groups? I argue that the government and the bureaucracy diverge in defining foreign policy ideals. While a government, especially a government headed by a populist leader, prioritizes short-term goals to gain public support and aim to immediately respond to international crises. However, the bureaucracy emphasizes the shared consensus about a state’s foreign policy goals, prioritizes seeking consensus among bureaucratic agencies and stability by building long-term diplomatic relations.
In this study, I will analyze the ideational differences between the elected and appointed officials in foreign policymaking about Turkey-Israel relations. Studies focusing on the states located in the Global South and the Middle East are still under-represented in foreign policy bureaucracy literature. The non-Western political systems are rarely on the scope of the FPA literature due to the approach that there are complex and untransparent decision-making processes in those states. In that sense, Turkey offers an explanatory framework to understand the shortcomings of the FPA theories in bureaucratic politics. Methodologically, my arguments will be benefited from the interviews that I conducted with 61 foreign policy-makers in Turkey.
Elite interviewing is also a rare practice in examining the foreign policy bureaucracy. The paper uses in-depth interviews to offers an alternative analysis in foreign policy beyond the official textual sources that are usually professionally redacted and share little information about the decision-making processes.