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While repression may be a policy adopted by authoritarian governments, it relies on the acts of many – agents of repression institutions – to carry it out. Personnel from the armed forces, secret police, and other security organizations are involved in repressive actions to varying degrees. After democratic transitions, efforts to bring perpetrators of repression to justice also vary. Over sixty countries have used criminal trials to punish those responsible for repressive acts under a prior authoritarian regime. Yet not all perpetrators are tried, not all are convicted, and when convicted, their sentences vary. What factors account for the fate of these perpetrators under transitional justice schemes? To answer this question, we focus on Argentina, a leader in the use of trials to achieve transitional justice. Since the mid-2000s, the Argentine judiciary has actively prosecuted military and police officials who played a role in the Dirty War under the 1976-83 military regime. In nearly 200 trials naming 1,200 defendants in courts around the country, the conviction rate in Argentina is close to 90 percent. Punishments range from house arrest to life in prison. Using detailed observational data on repressive actions, the individual officers most likely involved, and the trials, we quantitatively investigate two hypotheses. First, deserved justice: that officers who worked in areas that experienced the most repression were subject to more severe prosecution. Second, politicized justice: that officers who worked in areas more supportive of the Peronist Party encountered more severe forms of transitional justice. With our findings, we seek to better understand the link between authoritarian repression and efforts at transitional justice.