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How opposition parties respond to ethnopopulists in power is critical to understanding the dynamics of party competition and regime outcomes in countries where democracy may be under threat. The literature so far focuses on why voters support populist parties, and on why populists tend to engage in democratic backsliding if they win power. It overlooks how opposition parties respond to ethnopopulist incumbents and their strategies to concentrate power. We argue that opposition parties respond in one of two ways: they either bandwagon with them or oppose them across a regime divide. We show that parties opposing ethnopopulist incumbents across a regime divide adopt two main strategies: cooperation and competition. In countries where opposition parties hold quite different positions on economic and social issues, surprisingly, they cooperate through electoral coalitions and mergers. By contrast, in countries where opposition parties share more homogeneous social and economic positions, they largely eschew cooperation in favor of competing with one another.