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Exploring Rebels’ Choice over Alliance and Infighting in Multi-party Conflicts

Sun, October 3, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

What determines the rebel’s choice over alliance and infighting in civil wars? Of all the civil wars occurring between 1989 and 2003, two-thirds have multiple rebel groups involved. Groups may seek different political objectives or similar objectives in a different way against a common enemy, but in those conflicts, it is common to see the instances of forming cooperation and engaging in inter-rebel fighting as seen in Afghanistan, India, and the Philippines. This inter-rebel dynamics is puzzling because, first, violence among rebels reduces scarce resources which are important for them to fight with the incumbent government and, second, cooperation can increase the probability of victory but reduces expected values of outcomes. Moreover, in a chaotic situation like civil wars, credible commitment about the ex-post distribution of pies is hardly made ex-ante.

Previous works have studied the above two types of dynamics separately, although the mechanism discussed in those works are quite similar. Particularly, power-balance among rebels and common ethnic identity and religion are argued as key factors explaining the rebel’s alliance and fighting. For instance, while Bond (2010) considered co-ethnic identity as a key factor for forming cooperation, Christia (2012) argues that alliance is driven by power-balance among rebels. Similarly, Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) identify military balance as a key factor affecting inter-rebel conflict, but Pischedda (2018) explains co-ethnicity as a driving factor for violence.

While those works are critical in exploring micro-dynamics of civil wars, we argue that the mechanisms should not be taken as independent. The different findings of the previous works indicate that co-ethnicity can lead rebel groups to form alliances in some cases but drive them to fight each other in other cases. The same can be applied to the power-balance argument. This implies that it is a choice made by rebel groups of whether to form an alliance or engage in fighting. Thus, setting the two choices as alternatives and largely drawing on the above arguments, we examine what determines the rebel’s choices between alliance and infighting.

To do this, we make use of exogenous events that can suddenly change power-balance among rebels. Given that co-ethnicity and religious identity are constant across times, power-shift is expected to intervene in the mechanism on rebel’s choice. This study focuses on natural disasters, particularly rapid-onset disasters such as earthquakes and floods, and a sudden closing of resource production sites or trafficking routes as examples of exogenous shocks. We use data on the multi-party conflicts in Myanmar. Myanmar is an excellent case for examining the rebel’s dynamics in that there are more than 10 armed groups operating across the country with diverging ethnicities and different sources of income. Moreover, rebel groups repeatedly form an alliance and fight each other, which suggests that we have both cross-sectional and over-time variation within a single country. Myanmar is also one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Thus, analyzing both quantitatively and qualitatively using sub-national level information, we attempt to provide solid findings on inter-rebel group dynamics.

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