Rebel Regimes and Military Powersharing

• In Event: Revolutions and Statebuilding: Transforming Political and Social Institutions

Abstract

Dictators face a powersharing tradeoff: sharing power more credibly delivers spoils to elites, but also lowers organizational hurdles to staging a coup against the ruler. We argue that origins in violent rebellion create favorable conditions for achieving peaceful powersharing with military elites. Fighting enables rulers of rebel regimes to transform the military and to place members of their rebel group into top positions. Although these military elites possess the means to overthrow the ruler, sharing power with allies will alleviate coup risk. Using data on African regimes from 1960–2017, we establish that rebel regimes are significantly less likely to fall than others. We then show evidence for powersharing using originally collected data. Rulers in rebel regimes frequently transform the state military upon taking power. Compared to other regimes, they are more likely to appoint a Minister of Defense (who were usually guerrilla leaders) and less likely to face coups.

Authors

• Jack Paine, University of Rochester

• Anne Meng, University of Virginia