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Does human rights reporting deter abuse? Past research offers unclear answers to this important question. I argue that one reason for this ambiguity is that a selection problem afflicts existing research. Research thus far has considered whether “naming and shaming” reduces ongoing human rights violations, but not violations that could have occurred but did not. I argue that where human rights conditions are systematically monitored, potential perpetrators are less likely to utilize repression because they anticipate the costs of condemnation. The threat of shaming—signaled by the extent of human rights monitoring—can then deter abuse by capitalizing on the strategic considerations of potential transgressors. I develop a new global measure of human rights monitoring using text analysis. I show that monitoring systematically strengthens human rights even when monitoring is challenging. The efficacy of human rights advocates depends more on their ability to threaten condemnation than in carrying it out.