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Revolving-Door Channels and Public Resource Misallocation in China

Fri, October 1, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

While the existing literature focuses on how revolving-door officials can deliver favorable government treatment to firms after leaving public office, this paper theorizes that postgovernment career concerns of public officials distort public resource allocation while they are still in office. To test this theory, I construct a new dataset that links over 70,000 city-level subsidy programs with all city-level revolving-door officials who joined Chinese publicly listed firms between 2007 and 2019. I show that a firm's decision to recruit former officials is conditioned on the subsidies the officials provided while still in public office. I also provide a reduced-form estimate of the favorable treatment provided by forward-looking public officials and present evidence of the allocative distortion of favorable treatment. Last, I show that revolving-door officials who have provided favorable government subsidies receive approximately 30% more cash compensation than their peers, suggesting a form of quid pro quo relationship.

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