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Nature reserves are critical to biodiversity, but they often cut into the economic interest of local communities. How can governments resolve this dilemma? Conventional solutions focus on the “compensation” mechanism---governments can compensate local residents to offset the economic hardship caused by conservation measures. However, recent research has shown that this mechanism may not be viable in non-democracies whereby people have limited capacity to press their governments for sufficient reimbursement. This article reveals an alternative “diversion” mechanism: communities are incentivized to migrate and find work in cities for some period before settling there permanently. While compensation was designed to resolve local communities’ collective opposition against conservation regulations in democracies, diversion originated from the local communities’ collective adaptation to strict regulations in non-democracies. Using evidence from interviewees in three Chinese nature reserves with varying levels of economic development, I find clear evidence that compared to compensation, diversion helps improve peoples’ income levels and makes conservation management easier. Moreover, these advantages become more effective as economic development progresses. As the world’s biodiversity hotspots overlap significantly with low-income communities that are insufficiently compensated, these findings have profound implications for global conservation efforts.