Foreign Pressure, Reputation Effects, and Chinese Cooperation at the UNSC

• In Event: Legislative Politics of the United Nations

Abstract

Whether foreign pressure can influence Chinese foreign policy helps illuminate the extent to which China can be a cooperative player in international politics. In this study, I explore the importance of reputation concerns as a driver of Chinese cooperation. I argue that China is mindful in upholding a cooperative reputation in multilateral settings given the sanctions associated with having a bad reputation in international politics. An empirical analysis of U.S. and Chinese voting at the UN Security Council, along with new data on bilateral diplomatic visits and New York Times articles, tests this argument. Consistent with my theory, I find that China is sensitive to increased or negative coverage of its behavior when deciding how to cast a vote. These effects are especially pronounced when China suffers from a reputation deficit. My results bode positively for the prospects of Chinese cooperation in international politics, as information dissemination in the digital age is expected to exacerbate the costs associated with having a bad reputation.

Author

• Alicia R. Chen, Stanford University