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Liberal critics of state paternalism often claim that paternalistic policies undermine respect for citizens as equals, by expressing the message that citizens are too weak-willed or obtuse to advance their own interests efficiently. Yet, defenders of paternalistic policies and laws argue that there is plenty of factual evidence that ordinary people are quite vulnerable to cognitive errors or biases, which often mislead them into making the wrong choices. As such, defenders of paternalism argue that the state should impose paternalistic policies to prevent people from incurring harms that they do not actually want.
While the defenders of state paternalism are right to claim that factual evidence should determine what we should believe about other people’s abilities to advance their own interests, factual evidence alone is often insufficient to determine what it is justified to believe about others’ abilities, due to the existence of reasonable disagreement and bias. Oftentimes, people interpret “evidence” through the lens of their own prejudice, bias, and personal values. This makes it both epistemically unsound and morally objectionable to rely on a single party’s interpretation of the facts concerning a person’s abilities to advance his own ends. On the epistemic front, the prejudice and personal values of those who do the interpreting can distort the facts, producing epistemically flawed judgments. On the moral front, a single party’s interpretation of the facts can exclude other reasonable interpretations of the facts– especially, the interpretations of people from less educated, or marginalized racial or gender-based groups due to their epistemically disempowered position in society. This is why relying on a single party’s judgment about the people’s abilities to advance their own good can bleed imperceptibly into treating others as morally inferior.
To circumvent these problems, I argue that the evidence pertaining to people’s abilities to rationally pursue their interests must be interpreted through a public deliberative process in which the actors, experts, and policymakers jointly participate. When everyone’s claims are evaluated in public deliberation, every participant’s biases and prejudices are necessarily exposed to rational criticism. Consequently, no one – neither the epistemic authorities, nor the actors themselves— can insist on a particular judgment about the actor’s ability to pursue his own interests efficiently, without having that judgment verified through a public process of reasoning. In addition, because every participant’s claim is necessarily given equal consideration in rational argumentation and not rejected out of hand, everyone is treated equally as a legitimate source of valid claims, regardless of their racial, gender, or class background or particular conception of the good. Therefore, participating in rational argumentation itself guarantees equal treatment. Hence, I claim that both moral and epistemic reasons show that the “evidence” concerning a person’s abilities to rationally pursue his own interests must be interpreted through a shared process of public reasoning.
Building on this claim, I argue that in case public deliberation demonstrates that a person or group of persons is incapable of pursuing their own interests effectively in a particular situation, paternalistic intervention targeted at compensating for that incapability is politically legitimate. While intervening with others for the sake of interests that are externally imposed on them is illegitimate, intervening with others for the sake of interests that they themselves have approved through rational deliberation is compatible with the requirements of political legitimacy. I conclude with a brief observation about what effective public deliberation requires.