Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
This research note sheds light on the determinants of the allocation of budgetary transfers flowing from the European Commission, the European Union’s executive body, to the Union’s member states. Focussing on agriculture transfers, one of the most salient items over which the European Commission has discretion, I test whether the political closeness between Commissioners for Agriculture and national leaders matters for the allocation of agricultural funds at the European level. I first construct a measure of the absolute distance between each Commissioner and national leaders’ ideology. I then test whether this measure affects the share of agricultural funds countries receive from 1981 to 2006. Results show that ideological distance is a strongly significant deterrent of agricultural funds being channelled. The effects are strongest in election years for single-party, as opposed to coalition, ruled countries suggesting the importance of a “helping your political allies” channel.