Conflicted Aid? How Donor Goals Shape Foreign Aid Efficacy

• In Event: Designing Economic Coercion

Abstract

Whether foreign aid can ``win hearts and minds" in conflict zones is widely debated. While existing literature typically analyzes aid to states, this paper considers the effect of aid given to rebels, specifically focusing on the role of implementing partners. We argue that whether aid bolsters public support for rebel governance depends on whether donors' and rebels' goals are aligned. When donors share implementing partners' objectives, these partners can boost opinions of local governing institutions by highlighting their role in providing aid-funded services to the population. When goals are misaligned, however, aid becomes ineffective as implementing partners fail to do so effectively. We test this argument using new data from the Syrian civil war. We show that U.S. aid improved citizens' views of local governing bodies when it was provided with the goal of helping rebels defeat the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, when the U.S. supplied assistance aimed at countering violent extremism, it failed to sway public opinion. We further support our theory with qualitative evidence that uses original interviews conducted with U.S. aid workers, beneficiaries, and residents in Syria. Our study reveals a more nuanced relationship between aid and governance than existing literature suggests, with implications for both scholars and policymakers.

Authors

• Allison Carnegie, Columbia University

• Adam G. Lichtenheld, Yale University

• Priyanka Sethy, Columbia University