Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Whereas the selectorate theory predicts that authoritarian governments will allocate private goods to a coterie of domestic elites, we know less about the criteria dictators put into practice to select the recipients of these benefits. Dictators face a problem of adverse selection: they need to deploy distributive policies to fend off rivals and enhance authoritarian durability, but do not want to distribute scarce resources (i.e., spoils and one-off transfers) to societal agents that are unfit to guarantee the survival of the regime. Dictators, as any other politician, are embedded in systems of state-society interactions, social organization, and local norms that shape the policies they choose to distribute and how to distribute them.
In this paper, I focus on a well-established and fundamental unit of social control: the family. Concretely, I argue that local family networks offer a basic information shortcut to dictators seeking to enduring survival through distribution. Family centrality minimizes the risk of adverse selection, as well-connected families of elites are often composed of influential individuals capable of exercising social control. As a result, targeting central families can operate as an appropriate mechanism to transmit government influence and cultivate support at the local level.
To put this theory under empirical scrutiny, I combine original data from nearly 360,000 family trees (obtained after two years of systematic web scrapping) with lists of fraudulent land grants (collected after four months of fieldwork) in Paraguay in the 1954-2003 period. Preliminary results from a difference-in-differences design show that the Paraguayan dictatorship disproportionately transferred land grants to more central families before the downfall of Alfredo Stroessner in 1989. I complement these results with a body of qualitative evidence, which includes primary (collected during a thorough archival work in Paraguay) and secondary sources. Such evidence includes archival records (e.g., intermarriage ties, baptism certificates, and inheritance records) as well as biographic research by prominent Paraguayan genealogists.