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Scholars interpreting Machiavelli as a democratic thinker ground their arguments in his distinction between elites who desire to oppress and the people, who desire to avoid oppression. My paper revisits this distinction to suggest that it is not as clear-cut as democratic readers suppose. Their readings leave undertheorized Machiavelli’s account of popular desire and its manipulability. Specifically, I juxtapose the above distinction with a second such distinction advanced in The Prince: namely, that the many, unlike the few, “judge by the eye” and not “by the hand” and thus the people cannot help but judge things from a distanced perspective. Insofar as the many desire something, the object of their desire is mediated by elite manipulations of sight and touch. To disentangle popular desire from its reducibility to elite manipulation, this paper thereby interrogates how distanced judgment comes to empower and disempower.
First, I turn to Machiavelli’s sonnet to Giuliano de Medici, which implores Giuliano to ignore rumors about the exiled Machiavelli and to judge him “by the hand” instead of “the eye.” Machiavelli is, quite literally, far away; yet describes himself as Giuliano’s nearby companion. I argue this illuminates an underlying rhetorical manipulability: things perceived by “the eye” can be made to appear firsthand.
I then turn to The Prince’s chapter on liberality, arguing that it shows how the appearance of firsthand experience illustrated above becomes a source for elite manipulation. I read Machiavelli’s chapter alongside the literature on Medici liberality, especially their practice of patronage. This practice endeavored to make displays of wealth felt firsthand by their distanced audiences. In short, the Medici conflation of firsthand and distanced judgment served both to secure their displays of generosity and to obscure their involvement in the oppression of the people. Machiavelli connects the dots between these strategies.
Machiavelli thus shows how popular judgment can intersect with the desire to avoid oppression to make the latter an occasion for disempowerment. How, then, might the people’s judgment be made to resist this? Here, I consider Machiavelli’s comedy, La Mandragola, unpacking an interaction where the comedy’s antagonist, Nicia, is duped while believing himself to have attained firsthand judgment of the events of the play. On my reading, the comedy effectively “distances” its audience from its firsthand desires to offer a critical perspective on them. I thus argue that Machiavellian popular empowerment requires a navigation of the distinction between firsthand and distanced judgment.