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Local elections provide benefits to ruling parties in authoritarian systems, though they also create risks. In particular, local elections empower incumbent mayors who do not depend on higher-level politicians. Russia's hybrid system, in which some cities have elected mayors while others do not, offers an opportunity to test how authoritarian governments navigate these risks and benefits. This paper estimates levels of pro-regime election manipulation in 207 cities across six national elections in Russia, revealing whether local machines used their resources to support the ruling party, or shirked. Elections were most likely to be abolished in cities where powerful local machines were not delivering manipulation on behalf of the national party, a finding with implications for understanding the consolidation of the 'power vertical' in Russia, and ruling parties' efforts to reduce principal-agent problems common in election manipulation.