The Logic of Judicial Appointments and Purges in Authoritarian Regimes

• In Event: Power-Sharing, Personalization, and Regime Stability Under Autocracy

Abstract

Judges often serve as vital agents of law and order in authoritarian regimes. But whether judges dutifully execute orders can vary depending on the composition of the courts. How do autocrats maintain and regulate a reliable bench? This paper examines the logic of judicial appointments and purges under autocracy by focusing on patterns of selection and dismissal in an authoritarian judiciary. Drawing on an original dataset of judicial turnover in a one-party state, this paper illustrates how the politics of autocratic survival affects the logic of court-packing. Focusing on postcolonial Kenya, we examine both geographic and ethnic patterns in the make-up of the Kenyan judiciary from 1963 through 1992, a period of autocratic consolidation and breakdown. Our results suggest that changes in membership on the bench follows a similar logic to turnover in other African bureaucracies in authoritarian settings. This work contributes to existing findings on how the design and operation of judicial infrastructure facilitates autocratic survival.

Authors

• Fiona Shen-Bayh, William & Mary

• Danny Choi, Brown University