Timing and the Target of Elite Purges in Autocracies

• In Event: Power-Sharing, Personalization, and Regime Stability Under Autocracy

Abstract

Why do some dictators successfully purge rival elites and promote the consolidation of power, while others do not? This paper argues that to properly understand the dynamics of elite purges in autocracies, we need to pay careful attention to whether the targets of purges are military officers with access to armed forces, or civilian elites who have no such access. Specifically, I argue that whether a dictator can purge the group of civilian elites crucially depends on whether the dictator has already purged strong rival military officers, and thus the possibility of countercoups is low. I test this argument by using newly collected data on purges of civilian elites and military officers in autocracies from 1970 to 2005. I apply the panel matching technique. The findings suggest that purges of top-ranked civilian elites are increasingly likely to occur after a dictator has previously successfully purged top-ranked military officers. Purges of civilian elites, on the other hand, have no impact on whether leaders would purge militaries. The findings illustrate the importance of controlling militaries for dictators to successfully consolidate their power within the regime.

Author

• Jun Koga Sudduth, University of Strathclyde