Personalization of Power and Mass Uprisings in Dictatorships

• In Event: Power-Sharing, Personalization, and Regime Stability Under Autocracy

Abstract

Most major nonviolent civil resistance campaigns target autocratic regimes. Yet most dictators are toppled by their close supporters, not civilian protesters. Building on theories of strategic interactions
between leaders, security agents, and protesters, we make three core claims. First, protesters are relatively less likely to mount a major nonviolent uprising against dictatorships with personalized security forces since these dictatorships have partially mitigated,
via loyalty mechanisms, the moral hazard in employing security agents against protesters. Second, personalized security forces are more likely to repress the realized protest since their fate is tied more closely to that of the dictator. Finally, security force
personalization shapes the prospects for success of mass uprisings in toppling dictatorships and promoting democratic transitions. We leverage new data on security force personalization -- a proxy for loyal security agents -- and major nonviolent protest campaigns
to test these expectations. Our theory explains why many dictatorships rarely face mass protest mobilization and why uprisings that are met with violent force often fail in bringing about new democracies.

Authors

• Joseph Wright, Pennsylvania State University

• John Joseph Chin, Carnegie Mellon University

• Wonjun Song, Seoul National University