Sending a Signal: EP Vote Defection and National Coalitions

• In Event: EU Politics in Contemporary Europe

Abstract

Why do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) break from their party group? In this paper, we argue that MEPs deviate from their EP party group position when they are interested in sending a signal about the true positions of their national party. Specifically, we argue that MEPs whose national party is serving as a junior member of the governing coalition are more likely to deviate from the EP group in order to emphasize their national party’s true positions and to offset damage done to their image from the governing coalition back at home. Using EP roll-call vote data from 1979 to 2019, we argue that the defection rate of national parties from their EP party group is higher when the party is a junior member of the governing coalition. Following Klüver and Spoon (2020), we argue that since being a junior coalition member hurts the national party in the domestic polity, the party uses the European Parliament to distinguish its party brand from the coalition government. These findings have important implications for our understanding of multi-level governance, party and legislator behavior in the EP, and how governing status influences party behavior.

Authors

• Jeffrey Nonnemacher, University of Pittsburgh

• Jae-Jae Spoon, University of Pittsburgh