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Military coups are forceful acts of removals staged against incumbent governments. Yet, the newly emerged democratic coup hypothesis indicates the possibility of coup-led democratization. Do coups really lead to democratization? And, if so, why do only some coups end up with a democratic transition? In this paper, I
argue that successful coup leaders might legitimize their forceful takeover through democratization following the coup. I argue that wealthy countries, due to high volume of international sanctions, are more likely to democratize in comparison with poorer nations following a successful coup. After a failed coup, however, I argue that poorer nations become more inclined toward democratization compared to a wealthy country. Not being able to manipulate the army, wage a war, or build paramilitary armies, the civilian leader of a post-failed coup would choose democratization to appeal to military cadres and to survive longer.