Risky Business: An Ideological Basis for Variance in Nuclear Bargaining Outcomes

• In Event: Domestic and International Reverberations of Proliferation

Abstract

How do opportunities for nuclear reversal vary as a function of leadership ideology in counterproliferators? While previous research identifies the incentives for nuclear proliferation, it speaks less to how leaders decide to coerce targets into reversal. To examine this question, we develop a theoretical framework which merges research from political psychology, biopolitics and nuclear reversal. In contrast to some of the prior literature linking ideology to foreign policy preferences, we argue that liberal leaders in counterproliferator (or influencer) states are more likely to be risk tolerant and provide opportunities to targets for nuclear reversal. Conservative leaders are less likely to do so because of differing perceptions of the cost-benefit framework of negotiations (i.e., risk perception, experiential openness, and perceptions of gains). We test this argument by examining the decisions of the Obama and Trump administrations related to the Iran Nuclear Deal and conclude with some recommendations for policy-makers.

Authors

• Rupal Mehta, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

• Noelle Troutman, University of Nebraska-Lincoln