Religious Freedom, Pluralism, and Individual Rights

• In Event: Religion and Political Theory

Abstract

When pluralism is desirable and when it threatens other values is particularly salient concerning religious freedom. For example, the influence of Christian nationalists, who would promote a specific interpretation of Christianity as the only legitimate basis for public policy, threatens pluralism. Protection of individuals' conscientious beliefs from being overrun by majorities, however, is a desirable expression of pluralism in line with historic American values. First, powerful segments of the conservative religious community currently seek to promote a particular interpretation Christianity rooted in a biblical worldview. This segment of the religious right is a political movement. Its adherents believe that "right-thinking Christians should assume power in all spheres of life" (Katherine Stewart). To them, separation of church and state means that religious entities are denied benefits available to nonreligious ones. Although equal access provisions concerning public funding can be defensible, the resulting effects, however, cannot help but favor the dominant religious to the exclusion of other belief systems. The Supreme Court has been increasingly willing to allow both direct aid (Trinity Lutheran, 2017) and indirect aid (Espinoza, 2020) to both private religious schools and nonreligious schools without public accountability. Second, although greater aid to religion may appear to be a desirable promotion of pluralism, this is not necessarily so. In 2020, Attorney General William Barr described the protection of religious freedom as a top departmental priority and "as America's most fundamental value." But elevating religious freedom above other rights potentially allows these other rights to be upheld only insofar as they accord with the religious beliefs of the protectors. Different religions, as well as groups and individuals within the same religion, vary in interpreting their religious commitments. Other nations that follow this lead may use religious reasons to oppress women or LGBT individuals. Domestically, greater emphasis on religious freedom, especially when supported by public funding, may allow religious social service providers to avoid accountability and to discriminate against certain groups either as employees or as clients. In short, several recent Supreme Court decisions may expand the free exercise of religion for some, but do so in ways that can impinge upon the lives of those without alternatives who do not share these beliefs. Religious exercise can then function as a set of exit rights, allowing religious rights holders to refuse to participate in many of civil society's shared civic projects. Third, pluralism is highly desirable when it protects the conscientious beliefs and practices of individuals. The classic example is Supreme Court decisions that protect the rights of conscientious objectors to military service. These directly affect only the individuals involved. In other areas, the identification of stopping points for exemptions for conscientious beliefs, both religious and nonreligious, can be addressed in part through more general policies that are not direct toward religious liberty but that enhance it. A classic example can be found in a decision that rather than exempting Jehovah's Witness schoolchildren from being forced to salute the American flag, instead barred enforcement of the flag salute altogether (Barnette, 1943). This free everyone from state-compelled affirmations of political loyalty. More recently, Obergefell (2015) achieve marriage equality not be exempting same-sex couples from existing matrimonial laws, but by according to all individuals the constitutional right to marry the person of their choice. In these cases, pluralism and liberty of conscience are allied. Finally, protecting the religious liberty of religious institutions enhances pluralism favorably when it empowers those who adhere to their tenets. This sort of pluralism threatens liberty of conscience, however, when used to deprive nonadherents of what John Locke would call their "civil enjoyments" on the basis of religious beliefs with which they do not agree. Individual medical providers, for example, should be able to refrain from participating in abortions, but institutions should provide services to which patients are legally entitled, especially in circumstances that disallow patient choice. In sum, individuals should be free to live out their religious commitments. They should also be free to form religious enterprises rooted in common purposes without reflecting public values in every particular. Nevertheless, it is the state that must draw the line between the free exercise of religion and the rights of individuals who may be adversely affected by the religious exercise of others. Only liberal democratic states with final authority can represent the interests of individuals as such, regardless of their particular identities.

Author

• Emily R. Gill, Bradley University