Thucydides' Curse: Economic Sanctions and Target Public Opinion

• In Event: The Role of Public Opinion in International Conflict

Abstract

Sanctions have been widely used with the long-term decline in inter-state wars and the increasing preference for non-violent means of dispute settlement. The research on sanction effectiveness have highlighted the importance of public opinion in the decision-making of the target governments. Despite this, the effect of sanctions on public opinion has attracted relatively limited scholarly attention. Few studies on this question report mixed findings. In this paper, I investigate the role of uncertainty over intentions in influencing public support for policy change in the target state. Studies in crisis bargaining have identified asymmetric information as one of the most important reasons for cooperation failures. Studies on sanctions also highlighted how senders often have unclear goals. Yet we do not have any firm evidence about how such uncertainties would affect public opinion. How does uncertainties about the intentions of the sanctioning country (sender) affect public support for policy change in the sanctioned (target) country? I argue that individuals would be less supportive of policy-change when they suspect that the sender has `ulterior motives' or `hidden agenda'. I field an online survey experiment to test this claim. The findings indicate that sender countries may be able to maximize the effectiveness of sanctions by avoiding sending mixed signals regarding their aims.

Author

• Omer Zarpli, University of Pittsburgh