Good Czars and Bad Boyars: Power-Sharing and Blame in Authoritarian Regimes

• In Event: Authoritarian Durability & Adaptability

Abstract

As the most powerful figures in their political systems, autocrats should be natural targets to blame when their regimes perform poorly. While exposure to blame should increase the likelihood of autocrats facing mass opposition, this dynamic has received relatively little attention in the literature on authoritarianism. I argue in this paper that autocrats can mitigate their vulnerability to blame through power sharing arrangements in which responsibility for policy decisions is delegated to other regime elites. As this delegation more credibly empowers elites to make policy decisions, the autocrat should be blamed less for policy failures and targeted less by mass protests. I provide three sources of evidence for this argument. First, Google Trends data from Morocco and Russia illustrate how institutional reforms that strengthen the decision-making powers of subordinate elites reduce public focus on the autocrat. Second, survey data from the Afro and Asian Barometers show that individuals who perceive economic performance as poor are more likely to disapprove of the autocrat when they believe the autocrat has more power over the policy process. Third, cross-national data on authoritarian regimes indicate that autocrats who delegate more credibly are less likely to confront mass challenges to their rule when the public is dissatisfied. The paper contributes to understanding of authoritarian regime durability by demonstrating how power sharing arrangements can shape public perceptions of responsibility for bad governance.

Author

• Scott Williamson, Bocconi University