Proxies, Plausible Deniability, and Escalation Risks in International Conflict

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Abstract

States commonly rely on proxy actors to pursue their foreign policy objectives covertly. One purported advantage of covert action is its ability to limit escalation risks by providing states with plausible deniability of their involvement in conduct capable of triggering conflict. This argument implies that the use of proxies to pursue hostile acts should reduce attributions of blame and limit demands for retaliation among the public of the targeted country. However, many proxies often have strong, documented ties to their sponsoring state, raising questions about how plausible this deniability really is. This paper builds on existing literature about covert action by analyzing how Americans respond to experimental vignettes involving hypothetical hostile actions carried out by Chinese and Russian actors against the United States. The results show that Americans are marginally less likely to blame the Chinese and Russian governments and significantly less likely to support harsher retaliation against them when the hostile acts are conducted by corporate rather than military actors affiliated with these states. The findings suggest that proxies can generate plausible deniability and reduce escalation risks even in cases where their independence from the sponsoring state should lack credibility.

Author

• Scott Williamson, Bocconi University