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Until relatively recently, the rule of law was thought to presuppose laws that are divine. For how can law command authority if its framers betray the same fallibility and avarice that law itself is needed to correct and restrain? Worries of this kind lead some social scientists today to dismiss law as an “epiphenomenon,” but they led the classical and biblical traditions to find in divine law an alternate foundation for political authority. Is there a sense in which this alternative really escapes the quandary confronting human law? Or does it simply conceal that problem behind a veil of faith and piety? This paper explores these questions by turning to Plato’s Laws, the dialogue in which Plato most deeply broaches them himself. My purpose is less to show how Plato redeems divine law than to elucidate his understanding of its internal tensions. Through a close reading of the dialogue’s opening passages, I argue that the rule of law for Plato is implicated in a certain paradox: it both prohibits and requires the imitation of god. Law cannot safely originate with human beings; yet human beings must involve themselves nonetheless in laying law down. Trustworthy lawgivers must revere the gods while at the same time emulating them, must somehow make law themselves while regarding that very task as beyond their ken. Although the political psychology of lawfulness would therefore seem incoherent, I conclude by surveying reasons for thinking this conclusion unwarranted.