Drawing Better Lawmakers: Redistricting Institutions and Legislative Performance

• In Event: The Causes and Consequences of Lawmaking Effectiveness in Congress (Pre-Recorded)

Abstract

Several states have adopted independent redistricting commissions (IRCs) to counteract gerrymandering and declining electoral competitiveness, but evidence of their effectiveness is mixed. I investigate the legislative consequences of this electoral reform. Examining data on the U.S. House between 1980 and 2016, I find an association between being elected from an IRC-drawn district and legislative effectiveness (c.f., Volden and Wiseman, 2014), though I cannot decisively rule out selection effects. While these differences do not appear to be due to IRC-instituted changes in district composition, they do differ by the legislator’s incumbency status when their state adopted its IRC; while members originally elected by IRC-drawn districts exhibit substantially more effectiveness, incumbents representing non-competitive districts whose states switch to IRCs exhibit lower legislative effectiveness. This suggests that for such incumbents, IRCs make trade-offs between campaigning and lawmaking efforts more salient. Secondary analyses explore the behavioral manifestations of these differences as well as their durability over House careers.

Author

• Geoffrey M. Lorenz, University of Nebraska, Lincoln