The Three R's of CEDAW Commitment: Ratification, Reservation, and Rejection

• In Event: Promoting Human Rights: The Role of Law and Courts

Abstract

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has been studied by numerous scholars since its creation. Previous literature suggests that CEDAW improves state parties' human rights behavior. However, prior studies have not fully considered varying degrees of legal commitment to the treaty. We argue that a state’s choice to ratify, place reservations on, or reject CEDAW makes a difference for states' women’s rights. Building upon previous studies that code CEDAW signature/ratification, we code reservations that CEDAW members place on articles 1-30 of the treaty and identify general categories of reservation types. 35% of CEDAW members declare one or more reservations. Our theory draws upon law and political science literatures to evaluate how treaty reservations influence treaty compliance. Reservations can reduce treaty compliance by reducing the scope for compliance behavior and signaling which areas of the treaty a state is unwilling to comply with. However, we also consider alterative perspectives that states might use reservations to ensure domestic ratification of the treaty or that legal traditions such as common law influence states' treaty design. We utilize ordered logit models of women's political, social, and economic rights to evaluate the effects of varying degrees of legal commitments to CEDAW on such rights, finding that some reservations worsen women's human rights while other reservations improve human rights or have no effect. We use a variety of methodological strategies to address selection bias (e.g. matching, synthetic control). Our paper shows the nuances that institutional scholars must grapple with when studying treaties that allow for reservations.

Authors

• Willow Kreutzer, University of Iowa

• Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, University of Iowa