Populism as Communication: Political Campaigning on Facebook

• In Event: Populism Goes Digital

Abstract

In this article we adopt the notion of populism as a communication phenomenon that includes typical elements of content (i.e. people, anti-elitism, and the exclusion of out-groups) and of style (i.e. evoking fear, oversimplification, and style of language). We thus move away from actor-centered approaches towards a content-centered approach of studying populism. Empirically, our study measures populism to varying degrees and forms in 3564 Facebook postings of political parties in France, Germany and the United Kingdom during the 2014 EU elections campaigns, the 2017 national parliamentary election campaigns, and a non-electoral period in 2018 in each country. The results show that populism is not a marginal phenomenon, but that it is present in about one fourth of all postings in some form; that there is variance between countries, party types, policy fields, and over time. While radical parties are very exclusionary towards out-groups on the radical right and very anti-elitist on the radical left and the radical right, this observation provides only a partial view of the multifaceted phenomenon of populism.
Our results underline that it makes sense to study populism as a communication phenomenon that includes typical elements of content and elements of style. Populist elements were evident in the messages of all parties across the ideological spectrum, and confirm that over time a populist style is increasing particularly in the messages of radical parties on the left and right. But moderate and center parties are not always “non-populists”, as they tend to use a populist style during first-order election campaigns, but less so during second-order campaigns and in non-electoral periods. Radical right-wing parties employ all types of populism (full populism that contains elements of praising the people, being anti-elite, and excluding out-groups) on a constant level over time. Regarding the three countries included in our study, all forms and levels of populism, especially populism in style and exclusionary populism are increasing in Germany. In the UK, populist communication peaked during the 2017 national election, particularly empty populism, but not as much in 2014 and 2018. In France, all forms of populism are also increasing, but at a lower rate. Considering that the radical-right FN (renamed Rassemblement National) under Marine Le Pen, the radical left Melenchon movement La France Insoumise, the very low level of populist messages in France is somewhat counter-intuitive. Other French parties are quite reluctant to use populist communication. A possible explanation lies in the long tradition of legal constraints that prevent negative campaigning in France. Also, FN (RN) is very centered on Marine Le Pen, a lot of communication in general and populistic in particular is emitted by the party leader, not by the party and thus not captured here.
Studying populism as a communication phenomenon allows for a differentiated view: Yes, populism is increasing and has been scoring at the ballot boxes. But in many cases, it consists only of empty references of “the people” by moderate parties in specific settings. This is hardly threatening the integrity of democratic elections. The more problematic elements, such as the exclusion of specific groups from society, xenophobia, homophobia, attacks on elites, institutions and intermediary actors of various kind can be obscured by a global focus on populism. In many cases, referring to “the people” is a cloak to mantle illiberal, anti-democratic or authoritarian notions as a presumable “popular” agenda.
For a better understanding of how populism forms part of campaign strategies and how it mobilizes or demobilizes support, researchers need to look beyond only single type populist parties and their messages, speeches, party platforms, posters, and postings. Improved comparative research designs (beyond the particularities of individual parties or movements) and quantitative, data-based studies on more campaigns over longer time periods, can be attained by redirecting populism research from actor-centered approaches towards content-centered approaches. The notable difference between the findings in respect of first-order and second-order elections and non-electoral periods suggests that, depending on the political situation, the prevalence and intensity of populism as communication varies. The content-centered approach also makes better use of the available social media data of the past few years and allows new perspectives. It can be monitored by real-time research of social media, with the added advantage of generating much more data.

Authors

• Karolina Koc Michalska, Audencia Business School

• Ulrike Klinger, European University Viadrina