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A seminal literature sees corporate lobbying as a response to political intervention. Another large literature argues that lobbying is a means for corporations to ‘capture’ regulation and weaponize it against their competitors. However, surprisingly little evidence exists on the link between these propositions. We leverage improved new data on lobbying disclosures linked to publicly held firms and text-based measures of political risk at the firm-level. First, we establish that changes in political risk, indeed, do shape corporate political behavior. Since behavior is highly sticky, a marginal change in risk shapes a firm’s political behavior several years into the future. However, we also show that political risk only shapes behavior among firms that have lobbied in the past—it does not push new players into the game. To verify that the connection between government intervention and lobbying is causal, we leverage a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission pilot intervention, where the agency imposed a random rule-change among public firms. Finally, we show that political risk decreases revenue among firms that do not lobby. However, as firms intensify their lobbying campaigns, the negative effect disappears. On the other hand, we show that lobbying increases revenue—but only when political risk is high. Overall, the results suggest that firms both use lobbying to mitigate the negative effects of political risk and to capture political risk factors and use them to their own benefit.