Threats and Commitments: International Criminal Tribunals and Peace Negotiations

• In Event: Individuals and Institutions Under International Law

Abstract

Does the threat of international judicial intervention affect the agreements parties to a civil conflict make, especially regarding justice? In this paper, I argue that international criminal tribunals place a unique pressure on domestic elites negotiating peace in the wake of political violence. In order to avoid going to trial in the international arena, elites facing the threat of intervention have an incentive to agree to implement domestic accountability at home. By agreeing to hold domestic trials, elites signal to the international community that they can handle their own business while also signaling to their opponents how they intend to conduct themselves in peacetime. I test my argument using data on the content of all peace agreements negotiated between 2002 and 2019. I measure the threat imposed by international tribunals using data on the International Criminal Court (ICC), and find that the threat of ICC intervention increases the probability that peace agreements will include commitments to holding trials domestically.

Author

• Genevieve Bates, University of British Columbia