The Politics of Punishment: Why Non-Democracies Join the ICC

• In Event: Individuals and Institutions Under International Law

Abstract

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has extensive powers to prosecute individuals for core crimes under international law, including aggression, crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. Yet the ICC can only prosecute crimes involving states that have formally joined the Court, thereby accepting the Court’s jurisdiction. Previous scholars usually argue that governments join the ICC to signal opposition to international crimes or to credibly commit that they will not commit these crimes in the future, suggesting that the ICC constrains governments. However, we argue that non-democratic leaders use the ICC to target and punish their political rivals by facilitating selective prosecution of crimes committed within their territory. Because the ICC Prosecutor relies on the cooperation of member-states to investigate crimes, collect forensic evidence, provide witnesses, and arrest indicted individuals, leaders have extensive influence over ICC investigations. Political leaders can therefore enable the prosecution of some individuals, while hindering the prosecution of others, making ICC investigations a tool for sitting leaders to target their domestic opponents. We illustrate this dynamic with both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Our statistical analysis suggests that non-democracies are most likely to join the ICC when they face domestic political opposition to their rule. This finding is corroborated by in-depth case studies of ICC prosecutions in Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali.

Authors

• Leslie Johns, University of California, Los Angeles

• Francesca Parente, Christopher Newport University