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Rule of the People: A Republican Account of Democratic Legitimacy

Thu, September 30, 11:30am to 12:00pm PDT (11:30am to 12:00pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

What is the relationship between neo-republicanism and democracy? What are we to make of republican account of political legitimacy? What kind of contribution, if any, can Philip Pettit’s republican theory of democracy make to democratic theory?

Having been originally criticized for its elitist and depoliticizing features (McCormick 2003; Markell 2008; Urbinati 2012), Pettit’s republicanism is increasingly read in a positive light by democratic theorists in recent years. (McBride 2013; Watkins 2015; Urbinati 2019; Lafont 2019). There are two trends in the literature. The first group recovers the potential of freedom as non-domination for justifying democracy in either an intrinsic (Christian Rostbøll 2015) or instrumental way (Donald Bello Hutt 2018). The second group engages with Pettit’s account of political legitimacy that is grounded in the concept of “democratic control.” Some praises it as an accurate formulation of “democratic ideal of self-government” (Lafont 2019), because it opens space to advocate a participatory citizenship marked by citizen’s positive identification with laws to which they are subject. Others caution that there is a tension within democratic control, while appreciating its democratic credential. Namely, active participation in self-government exhibited by the constituting people at the ontological level contradicts a constitutional/juridic politics at the practical level (Aitchison 2017). At the heart of democrats’ appreciation of Pettit’s republicanism is the shared concern for political equality between republican freedom and democracy. Disagreements arise over how Pettit coordinates three ideas: republican freedom, democratic authority elaborated by political ontology, and democratic agency enshrined in the mixed constitution.

In this paper, I argue that Pettit’s democratic theory is primarily an account of democratic legitimacy, combining democratic authority and agency in a way foregrounding republican freedom. Appealing to the concept of democratic control, Pettit configures demos by a procedural conception of common good that initiates and sustains a deliberative form of democracy. So construed, democratic control has voluntaristic and rational facets: it assumes the willingness of citizens to live with others on equal terms, and underlines respect for constraints of rationality.

My paper will show to what extent Pettit offers a distinctive republican account of democratic legitimacy by analyzing its relationships to other relevant doctrines. To begin with, I contend that in contrast with most democratic theories, Pettit’s account does not argue for equalization of political power by elucidating similarities between expressive egalitarianism and republican freedom. It shall be underscored that Pettit’s democratic theory puts republican freedom instead of political equality at the center.

In addition, I illustrate that in rejecting legitimation by will approach epitomized by popular sovereignty, Pettit proposes a procedural account of political authority based on Sieyes’ constituent power. Thus, on the one hand, it includes a vertical account of authority that is missing from liberal accounts of rational justification among equals, while avoiding the challenge posed by the unification of a popular will. On the other hand, it is a republican account of constituent power according to which democratic authority is established in the manner of incorporation of a group agent rather than constitution-making.

Moreover, I demonstrate that Pettit’s account is characterized by its emphasis on public contestation of reason. On the one hand, invoking the idea of “norm of norms,” it echoes respect for rationality as demanded by liberal legitimation by reason approach. On the other hand, it shares the enthusiasm with deliberative democrats concerning the role that reason plays in politics.

Finally, I clarify that Pettit’s republican democracy is radical from the perspectives of both democratic authority and agency. First, since the constituting people is not episodic, the legitimacy of the State is always under strain. Second, his contestatory citizenship can be seen as more participatory. (Lafont’s appropriation is a case in point.) Pettit’s account is more expansive than a state-centered politics as he not only is not unconcerned with popular mobilization outside formal constitutional politics, but also explains what imposition of a direction means as required by democratic control, by referring to popular energy unleashed by social movements in changing democratic norms.

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