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My paper analyses state responses to ‘terrorist’ acts. I aim to explain spatial and temporal variations in government responses to insurgent activities in Kenya and Nigeria, exploring sub-national variations in militarized and discursive government responses to Al-Shabab and Boko Haram. I use a distributional politics lens to analyse government responses, conceiving of these as “security goods” and situating responses within the context of patron-client relationships. I suggest that political elites reward key constituent populations and geographical locations of core political support.
Speaking to a lacuna in the literature on government responses to insurgent violence in sub-Saharan Africa, I propose a theory of electoral instrumentalism. I argue that the timing of the attack (in terms of the volatility of the president and proximity to a competitive election), and the physical location of the attack (the extent to which the ruling party relies on affected areas for electoral support) are key determinants of a government’s security response. The extent of sociopolitical relations between local inhabitants and security agents particularly military also impact government responses. Through an analysis of within-country variation in responses to acts of violence in Nigeria and Kenya between 2010 and 2016, I show the significance of whether or not the targets of an attack and their ensuing demands for a robust state response constitute a core support base for the incumbent government.
The electoral vulnerability of the government, which can be understood along a continuum, further explains variation and nuance in both discursive and military responsiveness. Given that these factors change over time and with political transitions, examining state responses with attention to the security of the President and / or the proportion and strength of the governing coalition, helps us understand episodic engagement by governments facing so-called terror threats. By way of example, President Buhari relied heavily on supporters in the north (and particularly in areas affected by Boko Haram attacks), thus incentivizing a more robust political response than his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathon whose support base drew primarily from the south. Such patterns reflect a longstanding history of regional distributive politics in Nigeria. I show that similar patterns play out in Kenya, Cameroon and elsewhere.